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WHAT WERE JESUS AND THE PHARlSEES TALKING
ABOUT WHEN THEY TALKED ABOUT LAW?
David A. Skeel, Jr.'
Jesus' Legal Theory-A Rabbinic Reading opens with a startling
claim. The increasing number of legal scholars who have begun
exploring the relationship between Christianity and American law in the
past several years have neglected to consider the insights of Jesus
himself. "[N]otably absent from this literature," Professor Saiman
writes, "is any extensive examination of Jesus, and his views about
jurisprudence and legal theory. Despite the overall diversity of his
writings, there is little discussion about what Jesus thought about law,
lawyers, legal rules and the legal order."' What, the article asks, does
Jesus' own legal theory look like?
Many of Jesus' clearest pronouncements on the nature and proper
use of the law come in his skirmishes with the Pharisees, the forerunners
of rabbinic Judaism. It is on these exchanges, and the contrasts between
Jesus' and the Pharisee's perspectives, that Jesus' Legal Theory focuses.
As Professor Saiman points out, Jesus regularly resists the careful
parsing of precedents. When the Pharisees ask why his disciples are
plucking heads of grain on the Sabbath, for instance, he tells them "the
Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." 2 Similarly, Jesus
radically expands the concept of "neighbor" in the parable of the Good
Samaritan. The Pharisees and their rabbinic successors, by contrast,
place much more emphasis on the literal terms of the law. For them,
"meticulous observance of the Torah and its commandments ... reflects
the highest form of divine service." 3 These tendencies, Professor
Saiman argues, continue to distinguish Jewish and Christian
perspectives today. Rabbinic reasoning "involves the application of text
and precedent to facts, "4 whereas Christians tend to question whether
law is "the correct platform through which to analyze and decide
important religious and social issues. It is thought to be overly
• S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Permsylvania, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.
I. Chaim Saiman, Jesus' Legal Theory-A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L. & Religion 99.
2. Mark 2:27 (English Stand. Version).
3. Supra n. I.
4. /d. at I 05.
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res tn ct1 ve, and unjustifia b ly repl aces fa ith and love w ith rul es and
preced ents. " 5 After devel op ing thi s contrast through a se ries of careful ly
argued examp les, Professor Saiman conclu des by ex plori ng the
si mi lar ities betwee n the Jewish and Christian modes of interpretati on, on
the one hand, and, on the othe r, th e debat e between formali sm and mo re
fl ex ible approaches in contemporary law .
The Phari sees' lega l
reasoning emphasi zes the law's lette r and all of its corre lates (form as
opposed to subs tance, rul e of law, ori g inalisrn/textua li sm) , he argues,
whereas Jesus comes down on the side of th e law' s spirit (sub stance
over fonn , j ustice in the partic ul ar case, li v ing interpreta tion)
J esus' Lega l Theo ry is a model of law and religion sc hola rsh ip.
Although Professor Sa iman writes from th e perspective of a rabbini ca lly
trained lega l sc hol ar w ho is a sympa thetic outs ider to Christiani ty, his
aim is descriptive, to explore Jes us' and the Pharisees' diverge nt
co ncep tions of law wi thou t taking sides. For readers unfamili ar with the
rabbinic tradition, he intersperse s clari fying details to provide context
for hi s analysis of the debate. His analy ses of the textual reaso ning that
underlies the Pharisees ' vi ews on the Shabbat, the obligation s to a
neighbor and other issues w ill be especially eye-opening to those who
know the Phari sees simply as rul e-obsessed foils for Jesus' teachings in
the New Testament.
As with any sharp dichotomy, one can quibble with thi s one. To
give th e most obvious historical counterexample to Professor Saiman 's
contrast betwee n rabbinic attention to legal detail and Christian
fl ex ibili ty, th e Catholic canon law seems (as Professor Saiman notes) to
reflect the careful accretion of precedents he associates with rabbinic
reasoning. But the overa ll point is both subtl_e and compel ling: Jesus
and the Pharisees engage d in very different modes of legal
interpretation . Atten ding to th ese differences offers a multitu de of
ins igh ts into the New Tes tament, the Mosaic law and contemporary
American law .
The brief discuss ion that foll ows will raise, and worry the bone of,
a single question: what were Jesus and the Pharisees ta lking about when
they talked about law?
Strictly speaking, as Professor Saiman notes at the outset of the
article , the law at the heart of Jesus' di sputes with the Pharisees was the
law outlined in the Hebrew Bible: "the Torah or the 'Law of Mo ses,'
i.e ., th e legal rules an d prac tices observed by first century Jews." 6 For

5. !d. ct I 06.
6. !d. a t I 00.
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the purposes of the article, however, Professor Saiman defines Jaw more
broadly. "Law," he writes, "refers to a reasoning process, an ongoing
conversation whereby professional jurists analyze legal texts, precedents
and rules to reconcile competing social ideals and values." 7 As this
broad definition suggests, Jesus' Legal Theory assumes that Jesus'
statements about the Mosaic law apply not just to the Mosaic Jaw, but
also to contemporary secular law and any other context that involves the
analysis of legal texts.
The assumption that Jesus' stance on the Mosaic law translates
directly into other contexts is, it seems to me, worth examining more
closely. The recent American culture wars offer an obvious challenge.
If the dichotomy outlined in Jesus' Legal Theory is accurate, one would
expect to find Protestant evangelicals calling for flexible, open-ended
interpretations of the Constitution when the courts address abortion,
homosexuality and other sharply contested issues. Jesus condenmed
nitpicky interpretations of the law, the reasoning might go, so surely
evangelicals would distance themselves from the originalist and
textualist modes of interpretation that have been much debated in the
past several decades. Yet this is not what we see at all. Almost to a one,
the leading evangelical legal organizations decry flexible interpretations
of the Constitution such as Justice Brennan's "living Constitution" and
advocate strict adherence to its original terms. What gives?
If Professor Saiman's dichotomy were exactly backwards, and it
was Jesus who called for formalistic interpretation, the puzzle would of
course disappear. But this can't be the explanation. On any plausible
reading of the Gospel narratives-and I find Professor Saiman's
readings more than simply plausible-Jesus called for a broader, more
flexible interpretation of the Mosaic law than his Pharisaic interlocutors,
just as Professor Saiman suggests. Professor Saiman hints at a second
explanation: perhaps evangelicals have lost sight of the interpretative
principles that lie at the heart of their faith. "It is no small irony,"
Professor Saiman writes, "that groups who champion Jesus align
themselves more closely with the interpretive project of the Talmudic
rabbis than with Jesus' approach to both the Law of the Torah and law
more generally. Similarly," he continues, shifting the shoe to the other
foot, "those most likely to deny that Jesus has anything to teach us about
American law may inadvertently be bearing witness to Jesus' conception
oflaw." 8

7. !d.
8. !d. at 34.
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I agree that the evangelical obsession with strict construction is
incongruous in some respects. But I think we also need to consider
whether a flexible interpretation of the Mosaic law necessarily implies a
flexible interpretation of American Constitutional law. If there are good
reasons to interpret Divine law and human law differently, the irony may
not be quite so stark as it at first appears. To be sure, the distinctions
between divine and human law are often blurred in the New Testament.
When Jesus responds to a lawyer's question about who is his neighbor
by telling the parable of the Good Samaritan, his answer could be
construed as defining a legal obligation meant to be enforced by human
authorities (what we would now call a Good Samaritan obligation), a
moral obligation (overseen by God rather than men and women), or
both. I take him to be emphasizing the moral obligation. In other
passages, such as Jesus' Sermon on the Mount teachings that a person
who lusts has committed adultery and a man who is angry at his brother
is a murderer, the emphasis on God's law seems even more clear.
Because human regulators and law enforcers, unlike God, cannot look
into our hearts to discern our anger or lust, ordinary men and women
could never systematically enforce these principles.9
If these observations are more or less on the mark, they suggest
that one could plausibly embrace both Jesus' call to interpret the law of
God expansively and flexibly, on the one hand, and a narrow approach
to Constitutional and statutory interpretation, on the other. 1 From this
perspective, evangelicals' enthusiasm for strict construction is not as
paradoxical as it seems at first. To fully develop the argument, one
might also want to incorporate a theory or theories of judicial review.
One obvious candidate is the familiar concern that judges are less
accountable to the populace than legislators, and should therefore be
encouraged to curb any enthusiasm for expansive interpretation.
Having outlined a possible justification for evangelicals' insistence
on originalism and textualism, I should also note that the stridency of
this insistence seems to me to reflect other factors as well. I suspect, for
instance, the resonance within the evangelical community of complaints
about the refusal of "unelected judges" to be bound by the statutory text
also owes something to the tradition of Biblical literalism in American

°

9. For much more detailed analysis of the relationship between God's law and the secular
law, and of the proper scope of secular law, see David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz,
Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. Penn. J. Cons!. L. 809 (2006); William J. Stuntz,
Christian Legal Theory, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (2003).
I 0. Professor Saiman does in fact briefly allude to this possibility (p . 99), but in my view it is
dismissed too quickly.
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evangelicalism . Were we to plumb these connections, and to put them
in the context of Jesus' teachings, I do think we might indeed discov er
some irony in the evangelical stance.
A closely related issue of scope, in addition to the relationship
between God's law and human law, is the distinction between legislation
and its enforcement by courts or other decision makers. Although
Professor Saiman 's definition of law is capacious enough to encompass
both, he seems most concerned with the ex post interpretative role
played by courts or other decision makers. Jesus' skirmishes with the
Pharisees over issues such as the role of the Sabbath have this quality, as
does the analogy to Constitutional and statutory interpretation.
What, if anything, do Jesus' and the Pharisees' debates tell us
about legislation? In my view, Jesus' expansive interpretation of the law
of Moses actually may, for the reasons already discussed, imply a
narrow view of the appropriate scope of legislation that imposes secular
criminal or civil liability. As noted above, the laws Jesus describes in
the Sermon on the Mount are far too expansive to be enforced by human
law enforcers. Because law enforcers cannot look into a person's heart,
and because they are sinful just as ordinary citizens are, a liability
system that attempted to police every sin would be wholly
unmanageable and would invite discriminatory enforcement. Unlike
God's law, human law must play the double game of restraining the
worst sins of the citizenry without giving law enforcers so much
discretion that they are invited to sin themselves. 11
I would be curious to know how these questions of scope would
play out under a rabbinic approach to law-making. I suspect that the
reasoning process would differ from that of a Christian legal scholar in
much the same way as it does in the judicial context.
Take, for instance, a prosaic question like the proper scope of
corporate regulation. Christian legal scholars have tended to address
this question by identifying a handful of general Scriptural principles
and applying these principles to the modem corporation. Thus, Catholic
legal scholars have debated whether the general principles known as
Catholic Social Thought are best honored by vesting extensive
discretion in the managers of large corporations, or by governmental
intervention to promote the interests of otherwise disadvantaged

II. For elaboration, see Skeel & Stuntz, supra n. 9. This suggests another irony in
contemporary American evangelicalism-the tendency to assume that legislation can and should
be used to solve most social problems, despite Jesus' suggestion, as Professor Saiman puts it, that
"law is an ill-suited medium through which to structure social relationships." (p. 100).
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groups. 12 Protestant legal scholars too seem to reason from general
principles. 13 If the dichotomy outlined in Jesus' Legal Theory extends to
the legislative context, one would expect a rabbinic scholar to construct
· hi s or her theory from the ground up , starting with the closest Biblical
precedent for corporate behavior. As a dazzling young rabbinically
trained lega l scho lar suggested to me over coffee some months ago, a
rabbinic approach might look first at relevant Biblical precedents such as
the public ownership of the sacrifice or the treatment of offerings made
by the people of Israel. It would be fascinating and instructive to see
where this analysis leads--or has Jed, to the extent that rabbinically
train ed scholars have wrestled with th ese issues in the past.
As these comments reflect, Jesus' Legal Theory has the same
qualities as the very finest performances in other contexts: not only will
it cause both Christian and Jewish readers to think more carefully about
their own religious traditions; not only will it give them new insights
into a different tradition, and give other readers rich new insights into
both traditions and their influence on American law; but the article
leaves this reader, as I suspect it will many others, anxious for more.

12. For a survey of this literature and the debate it has spawned, see Mark A. Sargent,
Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought, 1 J. Cath. Soc. Thought 561
(2004).
13. See e.g. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 1 (2006) (relevance of religious conceptions of faithfulness to corporate governance).

